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EFFORTS TO REGULATE THE BITUMINOUS COAL
INDUSTRY PRIOR TO 1937*
THIs chapter supplies a background for the subsequent discussion
of minimum price fixing under the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937.
It describes the legislative proposals and programs designed to al-
leviate the heavy social and economic costs resulting from severe
competition. (See Table 2.) It does not deal with the efforts of
the federal government to set ceilings on mounting coal prices dur-
ing World War I or the strike of 1922.'
A. Legislatii.e Proposals, Laws, and Operators' Efforts to
Stabilize the Industry
1. RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNITED STATES COAL COMMISSION
The need for some regulation of the coal industry was recognized
by the United States Coal Commission in the early twenties. In its
report published in 1925 the Commission recommended "the use
of the powers of the Federal Government over interstate com-
merce" for the protection of the public and the promotion of the
normal development of the industry, and advocated that a Division
be set up in the Interstate Commerce Commission with "direct
responsibility for such regulation and supervision as is necessary."2
It further observed that "The most convenient and practicable
of the various possible methods of exercising the right of control
over interstate commerce in coal would appear to he the licensing
of all who desire to ship coal from one State to another or to buy
and sell in interstate commerce, whether as operators, wholesalers,
or jobbers. Reasonable conditions, logically growing out of the in-
herent power of the Government and implied in its exercise, would
naturally be attached to the granting of the license, and violation
of these conditions would be cause for suspending or revoking the
The Report was discussed at hearings in 1926, but the
reference then was chiefly to the anthracite industry, and the pro-
The authors are indebted to Dr. Mary Effie Cameron, a Fellow of the
Social Science Research Council in 194.2-1943, for her assistance in the
preparation of this chapter.
1Theexperience with maximum price fixing during World War II is dis-
cussed in Appendix A.
2Reportof the United States Coal Commission, 1925, Part I, p. 264.
8Ibid.,p. 269.
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posal made in the report for a continuing fact-finding commission
was the oniy one that was given much consideration.4 No legisla-
tion ensued.
2. APPALACHIAN COALS, INC.
In the absence of federal legislation to stabilize the coal industry,
some thought was given to the possibility of nongovernmental ac-
tion. On December 30, 1931, a group of southern coal operators
established a "marketing agency" called "Appalachian Coals, Inc."
It was not the function of this agency to sell coal—that service was
to be performed by subagents—but to announce and attempt to
maintain minimum selling prices among the producers who were
associated as shareholders in Appalachian Coals. The agency also
sought to inaugurate a form of production control by apportioning
the available orders among the shareholders. The entire undertak-
ing was halted at once by an injunction of the District Court of the
United States for the Western District of Virginia. On appeal,
the decision was reversed by the Supreme Court, which held, on
March 13, 1933, that the Sherman Antitrust Act does not preclude
persons from making "an honest effort to remove abuses, to make
competition fairer, and thus to promote the essential interests of
commerce.5 It observed that there was "no intent or power to fix
prices; abundant competitive opportunities will exist in all markets
where defendants' coal is sold, and nothing has been shown to war-
rant the conclusion that defendants' plan will have an injurious ef-
fect upon competition in these markets."° The Court held that seri-
ous consequences need not result from the contemplated reduction
in competition among the shareholders. The Court left the way
open, however, for a reconsideration of the problem if in actual
operation Appalachian Coals should come to obstruct fair competi-
tive opportunities and unduly restrain interstate commerce.7
Although Appalachian Coals, Inc., began, on the basis of this
decision, to operate several months before the National Recovery
Administration Coal Code was established, it functioned largely
under the NRA and, somewhat later, under the Coal Act of 1937.
Coal, Hearings before U.S. House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 69th Cong., 1st sess., March 30-May 14, 1926. On the first day
of the hearings Mr. Treadway of Massachusetts, the author of several coal
bills, quoted an adage that applies with singular aptness to subsequent efforts
at coal legislation, "If at first you don't succeed, try, try again."
5AppalachianCoals, Inc. et al. v. United States (1922), 288 U.s. 344,
p. 372.
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Whether it would have achieved its aims in other circumstances
it is not possible to say.
3. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, 1928-1933
In May 1928 Senator James E. Watson, of Indiana, introduced
a bill, the principal elements of which were the proposals for stabi-
lizing the industry with the aid of marketing pools of producers.8
(See the first column of Table 2.) The idea of licensing producers
engaged in interstate commerce, which had been advanced by the
Coal Commission, was made a basic part of the plan. The bill also
borrowed from the same source the suggestion that the total num-
ber of mines shipping coal by rail should be brought under public
control to forestall further overdevelopment of the industry.9 Bills
bearing the same title were introduced in the House on May 18
by Mr. Rathbone (H.R. 13880) and on December 3 by Mr. Casey
(H.R. 14453). Hearings were held on the Watson bill10 but no
further action was taken. Senator Watson introduced S. 2888 in
the second session of the 71st Congress on January 6, 1930, but
met with no success.
On January 12, 1932, a bill known as S. 2935 and H.R. 7536
was introduced by Senator James J. Davis, of Pennsylvania, and
Representative. Clyde Kelly, of Pennsylvania. This proposal was
similar to the Watson bill; the only notable departure.s lay in sub-
stituting for the maximum price provision a clause directing the
Commission to "hear complaints from any person, firm or corpora-
tion as to the reasonableness of the price schedules approved by it,"
and in abolishing the distinction between primary and secondary
licensees with regard to certain labor provisions. Extensive hearings
8 About three months earlier, a Joint Resolution had been introduced for
an investigation of conditions in the coal fields of central and western Penn-
sylvania, West Virginia, and Ohio. Pursuant to this resolution, hearings
were held by the Committee on Interstate Commerce under the chairmanship
of Senator Watson between February 10 and May 17, 1928. (Conditions in
the Coal Fields of Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Ohio, Hearings on S.
Res. 105, U.S. Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 70th Cong., 1st
sess., February 10-May 17, 128.)
Report of the United States Coal Commission, 1925, Part I, p. 268. "It
is by means of the granting and withholding of transportation service through
supervision that an equilibrium can be established between demand and
output. The Interstate Commerce Commission under the existing law already
has the responsibility for authorizing a railroad to put in sidings and to
furnish cars and transportation."
10 Bituminous Coal Commission, Hearings on S. 4490, U.S. Senate Com-
mittee on Interstate Commerce, 70th Cong., 2d sess., December 14 and 17,
1928 and January 14-19, 21, and 23, 1929.
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were held on the Davis-Kelly bill," but it did not progress beyond
the Committee.
On February 29, 1932, Representative David J. Lewis of Mary-
land introduced H.R. 9924, which had been modeled on the British
Coal Mines Act of 1930. The Lewis bill provided for a Coal Com-
mission of Presidential appointees and, under it, a Coal Operators'
National Council of about 50memberselected by the Operators'
Boards in the districts. In each of the 30 districts (27 bituminous
and 3anthracite)the Operators' Board, elected by the mine opera-
tors, was to be responsible for determining mine quotas within the
district quota handed down to it, and for fixing minimum prices—
on a specified cost basis—subject to review by the Council. Each
Operators' Board was to create a Sales Agency to handle the entire
output of the district, except "captive" coal.12 As revised (H.R.
12916), this bill was introduced later in the session, on July 6,
1932. Nearly a year later, on June 10, in the first session of the
73d Congress, a further revision was introduced as H.R. 6040 by
Representative Lewis and S. 1875 by Senator Hayden of Arizona.
By this time, however, the NRA had entered the scene, and these
bills received no consideration.
4. BITUMINOUS COAL CODE
On September 18, 1933, President Roosevelt approved the Code
of Fair Competition for the Bituminous Coal Industry. Under the
NRA Administrator (as ex-officio chairman) was placed the Na-
tional Bituminous Coal Industrial Board of fourteen to seventeen
members that was to meet at the call of the Administrator to make
recommendations to the Divisional Code Authorities and to the
President, and for other purposes.13 The five Divisional Code Au-
thorities were composed of men chosen by coal operators' commit-
tees that were "truly representative of the industry therein"; an
additional member was appointed to each of these Authorities by
the President of the United States. Subject to the approval of the
Code Authorities, the producers' voluntary associations—called
"marketing agencies"—representing at least two-thirds of the corn-
11ToCreate a Bituminous Coal Commission, Hearings on S. 2935, U.s.
Senate subcommittee of the Committee on Mines and Mining, 72d Cong.,
1st sess., March-June 1932.
12ibid.,Part 1, pp. 209-47.
13Fourwere named by the Code Authority of Division I, two by that of
Division II, and one each by Divisions III, IV, and V. Five were the "presi-
dential members" of the Divisions, and an additional three could be named
by the President.
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mercial tonnage in each area, determined "fair market prices"
which were, in effect, minimum prices for No provision was
made in the Code for maximum prices, and no direct production
control was contemplated. Twelve unfair commercial practices
(secret rebates, intentional misrepresentation of coal offered for
sale, special treatment of some customers, etc.) were listed, and
were prohibited to code members.
Collective bargaining was guaranteed in the Code, and specified
minimum wages and maximum hours were set forth.'5 In each Di-
vision a Bituminous Coal Labor Board was set up and, at the call
of the Administrator, the National Bituminous Coal Labor Board
could be convened. Violation of any of the provisions of the Code
subjected the violator to deprivation of Code membership.'°
Under the Code the United Mine Workers of America quickly
rose to a position of power in the industry. The administration of
minimum prices was a task rendered difficult at the outset by the
vagueness of the Code provisions regarding them,'7 and aggravated
by the necessity of coordinating the work of largely autonomous
Divisional Code Authorities. At the close of 1934, violations of
the minimum price'structure were occurring widely and frequently,
and by the early months of 1935thestructure had all but col-
lapsed. The decision of the Supreme Court in the Schechter Case,
t4 In areas where there were no marketing agencies the fair prices were to
be established by the Code Authorities.
Maximum hours of labor were set at 40 for each calendar week, and
at 8 for any day. Minimum rates of pay were set forth in two columns of a
schedule attached to the Code, one column applying to "inside skilled labor"
and the other to "outside common labor." Minimum rates of pay were stated
in both daily and hourly terms. They varied between districts (or parts of
districts) and ranged from $3.40 to $5.63 for inside skilled labor, and from
$2.40 to $4.82 for outside common labor. It was provided that the foregoing
could be changed at a conference of representatives of employers and em-
ployees operating under the Code, together with representatives of the Na-
tional Recovery Administration, scheduled to meet on January 5, 1934.
Codesof Fair Competition, National Recovery Administration, 1, 323
(Code) and 702 (Revision); Ix, 665 (Amend. 1); x, 431 (Amend. 2); xi,
391 (Amend. 3); XVIII, 509 (Amend. 4); xx, 175 (Amend. 5); xxi,
169 (Amend. 6); xxii, 147 and 267 (Amends. 7 and 8).
On January 25, 1935, further guidance was offered in Amendment No.
6 (ibid., xxi, 173) which stated that price-fixing bodies must take into con-
sideration employment opportunities, minimum wage rates, competition with
other coals and fuels, and the "customs, requirements and needs" of coal
buyers and consumers. In carrying out these duties the marketing agencies
and Code Authorities were instructed to "classify all coals, applying all fac-
tors usually considered in connection with physical structure and chemical
analysis and their effect upon the salability and use value of such coals. ..."
Noreference was made to costs of producing coal.
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on May 27, 1935, invalidated the National Industrial Recovery
Act,'8 and so the operation of the first general program for con-
trolling the bituminous coal industry came to an end.
5. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS CULMINATING IN BITUMINOUS COAL
CONSERVATION ACT OF 1935
Legislation to replace the NRA coal code was proposed early in
1935, when the original Guffey-Snyder bill (S. 1417, H.R. 4661)
was introduced in the first session of the 74th Congress, on Janu-
ary The major provisions were as follows:
There was to be set up, in the Department of the Interior, a Na-
tional Bituminous Coal Commission, of five members appointed by
the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
There was to be a National Coal Producers' Board, appointed by
the 24 district boards of the bituminous coal industry.
A single minimum price was to be established for each district
by the Commission. This price was to be an f.o.b. mine price equal
to the average cost of production of all mines in each district (ex-
clusive of depreciation and depletion), as determined by the Com-
mission.
When necessary, maximum prices could be established by the
district boards, subject to the approval of the Commission.
Price control was to be supplemented by production control. The
National Coal Producers' Board would establish quotas for the
districts. Each district board would then assign quotas to the mines
of the district.
A sum of $300,000,000 was to be appropriated, under this bill,
for the purpose of buying marginal coal mines and generally hold-
ing them out of operation.
Operators who failed to abide by the Code could be deprived of
code membership. Without such membership they would have to
pay the full amount of a 25 per cent tax on every ton of coal that
they sold.
Collective bargaining was guaranteed to the coal miners. Also
they could refuse to join a company-dominated union, and could
assemble peaceably to hear unionism discussed. They could not be
required to live in company-owned houses or to trade at company-
18 Schechter Corporation v. United States (1935), 295 U.S. 495.
19 This bill was obviously indebted to the old Lewis and Hayden proposals
of 1932 and 1933. Senator Hayden and Representative Lewis thereupon re-
turned the compliment by borrowing the "coal reserve" idea from the Guffey-
Snyder bill and introducing their new plan (S. 1922 and H.R. 5856) on
February 18, 1935.
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owned stores. They were to have the right to select their check-
weighman. Bituminous Coal Labor Boards were to be established.
Maximum hours and minimum wages agreed to by certain parts
and proportions of the industry were to be binding upon other parts
and proportions of the industry. (See Table 3, note c.)
Hearings were held in February and March,2° and the bill then
went to the Committee on Interstate Commerce, whence it emerged
under the designation S. 2481 •21 A further revision (see the fifth
column of Table 2), identified as H.R. 8479, was the subject of
hearings in June.22 The chief revisions provided for 22 district
boards, required that the Commission approve the minimum prices
proposed by the boards, provided that maximum prices be set at
uniform distances above the minimum, declared 12 specific com-
mercial practices to be unfair under the Code, and modified the
procedures for establishing maximum hours and minimum wages
(see Table 3, note e). In this bill numerous minimum prices,
rather than one, were to be established for each district. They
were now to be based on the weighted average cost of a "minimum
price area," which was not necessarily close to the average cost of
any given district; it was now required that the minimum prices
should yield a return for a minimum price area approximately equal
to the weighted average cost of that area.
A still further revision (H.R. 9100) was introduced in the House
on August 13 and passed six days After amendment it
was passed by the Senate on the 22d. A conference report on the
bill was passed the next day.24 The bill was signed by President
Roosevelt on August 30, 1935.25 The Bituminous Coal Act of 1935
provided for a National Bituminous Coal Commission in the In-
terior Department, 23 district boards in the industry, minimum and
(when necessary) maximum prices, a Counsel to protect the con-
20 Stabilization of the Bituminous Coal Mining industry, Hearings on S.
1417, U.S. Senate subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate Commerce,
74th Cong., 1st sess., February and March 1935.
21 To Stabilize the Bituminous-Coal-Mining industry, U.S. 74th Cong.,
1st sess., S. Report No. 470 to accompany S. 2481 (1935).
22 Stabilization of the Bituminous Coal Mining industry, Hearings on H.R.
8479, U.S. House subcommittee of the Committee on Ways and Means,
74th Cong., 1st sess., June 17-2 1 and 25-28, 1935.
Bituminous Coal Conservation Bill of 1935, U.S. 74th Cong., 1st sess.,
H. Report No. 1800 to accompany HR. 9100 (1935).
24 To Stabilize the Bituminous-Coal-Mining Industry, U.S. 74th Cong.,
1st sess., S. Report No. 1895 to accompany HR. 9100 (1935).
2549 U.S. Stat. at L. (1935), 991.
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sumers of coal, penalties for violations of the Code, and the same
labor provisions as those in H.R. 8479.
The Act resembled the earlier Guffey bills in many respects, but
exhibited several modifications:
—The National Coal Producers' Board was eliminated.
—The cost of producing coal in specified "minimum price areas"
replaced the cost of producing coal in the districts (S. 1417) as
the basis for setting minimum prices, and numerous minimum
prices were to be established in each district.
—Maximum prices were to be raised uniformly above established
minimum prices, thus limiting the action of the Commission in
determining such prices.
—Twelve commercial practices(first set forth under the NRA
Code) were designated as "unfair."
—The office of the Consumers' Counsel was created.
—The quota provisions were eliminated.
—The Coal Reserve program was abandoned.
—The tax on sales outside the Code was reduced from 25 per cent
to 15 per cent.
The National Bituminous Coal Commission was appointed and
started to carry out its duties under the Act. Almost immediately,
however, the program was contested in the courts, at first by the
President of the Carter Coal Company and then by many others.
On May 18, 1936, the Supreme Court held2° that the labor provi-
sions of the Act were constitutionally invalid, and expressed the
opinion that the price-fixing provisions were so closely related to the
labor provisions that they must fall as well. The Coal Act of 1935
thus became invalid before the Coal Commission had begun to
operate fully.
6. BITUMINOUS COALACT OF 1937
In spite of the Supreme Court's doubt, expressed in the Carter
decision, whether the price-fixing provisions "if separately enacted,
could be sustained," Senator Guffey introduced, two days later, a
new bill (S. 4668 and H.R. 12800, 74th Cong., 2d sess.) which
largely reproduced the Act of 1935 except for the labor provisions
that had been declared invalid. Another important change related
to the locus of minimum-price-fixing responsibility: formerly, the
Commission merely expressed its approval or disapproval; under
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Notes to Table 3
x Designated provision included in proposal or law.
a Primary licenses were to be issued to persons, firms, and corporations
engaged in the production of and interstate or foreign commerce in bituminous
coal. Such licenses were intended to permit the formation of marketing pools
and cooperative selling associations for the purpose of agreeing on the
market prices of their coals. Such persons, firms, and corporations were to
be required to accept all the provisions set forth in the bill. Secondary licenses
were to be granted by the commission to corporations engaged in the mining
or shipping of bituminous coal in interstate or foreign commerce that did
not wish to accept all the provisions of the bill. Secondary licenses were to
be granted only on the condition that the corporations applying for them
should agree to abide by certain specified labor provisions of the bill.
b"Itis hereby declared to be the public policy of the United States that
employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and shall be free from interference,
restraint or coercion of employers, or their agents in the designation of such
representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection and
that no employee and no one seeking employment shall be required as a
condition of employment to join any company union. ..." TheAct of 1937
contains substantially the same provisions. It was also provided, in the Act
of 1987, that "No coal (except coal with respect to which no bid is required
by law prior to purchase thereof) shall be purchased by the United States,
or by any department or agency thereof, produced at any mine where the
producer has failed at the time of the production of such coal to accord
to his or its employees the rights set forth" above.
"... employeesshall be free to terminate their employment and join a
labor union at will, and no contract of employment which is intended to
impair this right shall be lawful."
d"Wheneverthe maximum daily and weekly hours of labor are agreed
upon in any contract or contracts negotiated between the producers of more
than one-half the annual national tonnage and the representatives of more
than one-half the mine workers employed, such maximum hours of labor
shall be accepted by all the Code members. The wage agreement or agree-
ments negotiated by collective bargaining in any district or group of two
or more districts between representatives of producers of the majority of its
annual tonnage production and representatives of the majority of the mine
workers therein belonging to a recognized national association of mine
workers, shall be filed with the Labor Board and shall be accepted as the
minimum wages forall such classifications of labor by Code members
operating in such district or group of districts."
eThisprovision is the same as that proposed in note d, except that two-
thirds is substituted for one-half with regard to tonnage. The period during
which these relationships are to be measured is the "preceding calendar year."
Applies only to sales of coal to United States agencies.
Source: For the legislative references, see the notes to Table 2.
the new bill the District Boards simply proposed and coordinated
the minimum prices and the Commission then established them.27
27Underthe sixth heading in the majority opinion in the Carter case the
Supreme Court made the following comments upon the labor provisions:
"the difference between producing coal and regulating its production is, of
course, fundamental. The former is a private activity; the latter is necessarily
a governmental function, since, in the very nature of things, one person may
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Hearings were held on the bill in May28 and in June.29 Both com-
mittees reported the bill favorably. The House passed it, but in the
Senate a threatened filibuster prevented action at the end of the
session.
The bill was introduced in the first session of the 75th Congress,
on January 6, under the designations S.1andH.R. 4985. It was
recommended by the Committee on Ways and Means.3° Hearings
were held in and the bill passed in the House. The bill
went to the Committee on Interstate Commerce which recommended
its passage.32 On April 5 the Senate passed the bill, and within
a week the conference report was The Bituminous Coal
Act of 1937 was approved by the President on April 26,
B. Trend of Congressional Thinking as Reflected in Legislative
Proposals and Laws Seeking to Stabilize the industry
It may be of interest to trace the topical threads that run through
Table 2 for the evolution of Congressional thinking on the basic
approach to be followed in stabilizing this problem-ridden industry.
1. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
Early legislative proposals offered a rather simple organizational
structure by which regulation was to be achieved. Most of the work
evidently was to be accomplished by marketing pools, and that
which could not be so handled was to be lodged with a Bituminous
not be intrusted with the power to regulate the business of another, and
especially of a competitor." It denounced the arrangement as a clearly arbi-
trary delegation of a governmental function. Although applied to the labor
provisions in the Carter case, it might easily have been applied to price-
fixing provisions such as those in the Act of 1935. (Carter v.CarterCoal
Company [1936], 298 U.S. 238.)
28BituminousCoal Act of 1936, U.S. 74th Cong.,2d sess., H. Report No.
2832 to accompany H.R. 12800 (1936).
29ToRegulate lnters'tate Commerce in Bituminous Coal, Hearings on S.
4668, U.S. Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 74th Cong., 2d sess.,
June 3, 12, and 13, 1936. See also Bituminous Coal Act of 1936, 74th Cong.,
2d sess., S. Report No. 2370 to accompany S. 4668 (1936).
30BituminousCoal Act of 1937, U.S. 75th Cong., 1st sess., H. Report
No. 294 to accompany H.R. 4985 (1937).
81ToRegulate Interstate Commerce in Bituminous Coal, Hearings on S.
1, U.S. Senate subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate Commerce,
75th Cong., 1st sess., March 1, 2, 8, and 15, 1937.
82BituminousCoal Act of 1937, U.S. 75th Cong., 1st sess., S. Report No.
252 to accompany H.R. 4985 (1937).
83RegulatingInterstate Commerce in Bituminous Coal, U.S. 75th Cong.,
1st sess., H. Report No. 578 to accompany H.R. 4985 (1937).
8450U.S. Stat, at L. (1937), 72.
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Coal Commission. At the second stage, the Lewis bill proposed a
much stronger and more realistic structure consisting of district
boards and a national council of coal operators. The fragmentation
of control, represented by the five Divisional Code Authorities, con-
stituted a .serious weakness in the NRA The first Guffey
bill resembled the Lewis bill very closely. Subsequent revisions of
the Guffey bill, however, omitted the National Coal Producers'
Board, probably because, with the dropping of production control,
such a Board became superfluous.
The Interior Department has been the location proposed for a
Coal Commission from the time of the Lewis bill onward, except
under the NRA. This arrangement was unique: "No other inde-
pendent regulatory commission was thus located inside one of the
regular executive Yet the Department had no ad-
ministrative control over the Commission. The Secretary of the In-
terior was to receive the Commission's annual report and transmit
it to Congress (S. 4668), but under the Act of 1937 he was de-
prived of that responsibility. Secretary Ickes asserted in 1938, "I
do not know of anything going on in the Coal Commission, except
what I read in the
2. DETERMINATION OF MINIMUM PRICES
Under the Watson bill prices were to be set by marketing pools.
The Lewis bill not only provided Operators' Boards to perform this
task but specified the cost formula to be used in arriving at mini-
mum prices. The NRA Code failed to provide a cost basis or, in-
deed, until Amendment No. 6 was issued, any meaningful pro-
cedural guidance. The first Guffey bill restored a cost basis to
minimum-price fixing and kept it wholly within a district frame-
work. The second and subsequent Guffey bills introduced the
flexibility that inheres in using the cost in a group of districts called
a "minimum price area," and permitted more than one minimum
price to be established within a district.
3.PROTECTIONOF CONSUMERS
How were consumers of coal to be protected? The Davis-Kelly
These five Authorities were so nearly autonomous that a National Coal
Board of Arbitration eventually had to be set up (by Amendment No. 6,
January 25, 1935) to settle administrative disputes, arising between Di-
visional Code Authorities or their Subdivisions.
36RobertE. Cushman, The Independent Regulatory Commissions (Ox-
ford University Press, 1941), p. 379.
Quoted in Cushman, op.cit., p. 380.
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bill provided that the Commission was to hear complaints as to the
reasonableness of the prices fixed. The NRA Code made no ref-
erence to the question. All other bills provided for the setting of
maximum prices when necessary, either by marketing pools (Wat-
son bill) or the district boards (S. 1417) subject to the approval of
the Commission, or (beginning with H.R. 8479) by the Commis-
sion itself.
Consumers and producers of coal were protected from twelve un-
fair commercial practices under the NRA Code and, beginning with
H.R. 8479, thereafter. A thirteenth prohibition was added on April
9, 1937.38
An additional protection for consumers was included in the Act
of 1935 and subsequent bills. This was the appointment of a Con-
sumers' Counsel, who was given broad powers to represent the
consuming public in all proceedings before the National Bituminous
Coal Commission, and to get from the Commission any information
in its possession or obtainable by investigation.
4. REGULATION OF MINING CAPACITY
Because of the generally held opinion that the bituminous coal
industry was overdeveloped, it was to be expected that Congress
would concern itself with measures (a) to prevent further over-
development, and (b) to close high-cost mines. The U.S. Coal
Commission of 1922 offered an answer to the first part of this
problem. It would require new mines to get the approval of the
Interstate Commerce Commission before making any railroad con-
nections. This suggestion was adopted in the Watson bill which
called for the approval of .such connections by the Bituminous Coal
Commission before permission could be granted by the ICC. The
provision was continued in the Davis-Kelly bill, but was omitted
from all subsequent plans. The same result was obtainable, how-
ever, under the quota plan that was advanced in the Lewis bill and
in S. 1417. Under these bills a new mine not considered necessary
presumably could be denied a production quota.
The second part of the question received consideration in the
early Guffey bills, S. 1417 and H.R. 8479. A Bituminous Coal
38RegulatingInterstate Commerce in Bituminous Coal, U.S. 75th Cong.,
1st sess., H. Report No. 578 to accompany H.R. 4985 (1937), p. 7. This
forbids the employment of any person or the appointment of any sales agent,
at a compensation obviously disproportionate to the ordinary value of the
service or services rendered, and whose employment or appointment is made
with the primary intention and purpose of securing preferment with a pur-
chaser or purchasers of coal.
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Reserve was to be created, and the Secretary of the Interior was
authorized (after approval by the Commission) "to purchase or
acquire by condemnation proceedings, in the several States, coal
mines, coal properties, coal lands, mining rights, lease-holds, roy-
alties, and any interest in coal and lands containing bituminous
coal deposits suitable for mining. .." Ineach case the Commission
was to advise the Secretary of the Interior, and this advice was to
be based upon considerations of conservation, employment oppor-
tunities, cost of coal to the consumer, fair competitive relations, and
elimination of overcapacity for coal production in the industry. No
coal mining was to be permitted in the acquired lands except upon
order of the Commission (after hearing and finding that the opera-
tion was in the public interest) or, in time of war, by the President.
This plan did not appear in any subsequent bills.
The quota arrangements in the Lewis bill and in S. 1417were,
however, only incidentally concerned with the question whether the
industry was to be prevented from further overdevelopment. The
chief purpose of these arrangements was to supplement and facil-
itate the stabilizing efforts involved in minimum price fixing. In
later bills the whole burden was borne by the minimum-price provi-
sions
5.PENALTIESFOR VIOLATIONS
Framers of coal legislation have been unanimous in providing
penalties, of one sort or another, for violations of the prescribed
code. The Lewis bill introduced the arrangement whereby a large
tax was imposed (20 per cent) and a drawback was allowed to
producers complying with the code (99 per cent of the tax). The
NRA Code had no provision of that kind: violators were simply
dropped from code membership and were thus denied the privilege
of operating under the Blue Eagle. The earliest Guffey bill adopted
the tax idea advanced in the Lewis bill, but changed the tax to 25
percent, and reduced the drawback to 90 per cent. The next ver-
sion, H.R. 8479, raised the drawback to 99 per cent. The 1935
89Itshould be noted, perhaps, that an unofficial "form of tonnage alloca-
tion" actually operated under the NRA, in some of the subdivisions of Divi-
sion I, between July 12, 1924 and the end of the year. This tonnage ar-
called the "Adams Plan," was used as an adjunct to price fixing:
if tonnage percentages changed under a schedule of prices, it was taken as
an indication that the prices should be revised. (See F. E. Berquist and
Associates, Economic Survey of the Bituminous Coal Industry under Free
Competition and Code Regulation [National Recovery Administration, March
1936], pp. 524-25.)
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Act retained this device, but lowered the tax to 15 per cent and
the drawback to 90 per cent. This arrangement was continued in
the first draft of S. 4668, but the Senate Committee on Interstate
Commerce struck it out and substituted two taxes: a tax of 1½
per cent on all coal sold in interstate commerce, and a tax of 13½
per cent on coal sold in interstate commerce by producers who were
not members of the code.4° The Act Of 1937 changed the smaller
tax to 1 cent a ton, and the larger to 19½ 'per cent of the value
of coal sales by noncode members.
6. LABOR PROVISIONS
It will be seen in Table 2 that the right to bargain collectively
has been prescribed from the beginning. Under the NRA and in
'the first three Guffey bills Labor Boards were provided. Maximum
hours and minimum wages were introduced by the NRA Code, and
the first three Guffey bills attempted to write a formula for es-
tablishing such maxima and minima. It was this latter attempt
that brought forth the condemnation by the Supreme Court in the
Carter case.4' After the Carter decision the succeeding drafts of
the Guffey bills omitted nearly all efforts to prescribe labor rela-
tionships in the industry and contained only a statement that col-
lective bargaining and protection against company-dominated uni-
ons represent the public policy of the United States. In the Act of
19S7 an additional provision prevented the purchase of coal by
United States agencies from producers who did not accept the Code.
Table 3 will permit the reader to trace, in greater detail, the
labor provisions that have been incorporated in the successive bills.
It should be recalled, of course, that most of the protective clauses
shown here did not continue after 1936. This omission may be
attributed in part to the passage of the 'Wagner Act, in part to the
invalidation of the Guffey Act of 1935 because of its labor provi-
sions, and in part to the fact that the United Mine Workers had
by that time gained so much strength that legislative protection of
this sort appeared to be unnecessary.
40 Bituminous Coal Act of 1936, 74th Cong., 2d sess., S. Report No.
2370 to accompany S. 4668 (1936), pp. 1, 2, and 5.
41 "The effect, in respect of wages and hours, is to subject the dissentient
minority, either of producers or miners or both, to the will of the stated
majority. ... Thisis legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form. ..
(Carterv. Carter Coal Company, [1936], 298 U.s. 238.)
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